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Summary
In spite of its massively parallel architecture [1], the human
brain is fundamentally limited if required to perform two
tasks at the same time [2, 3]. This limitation can be studied
with the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm,
where two stimuli that require speeded responses occur in
close succession [4]. Interference generally takes the form
of a delay in the time to respond to the second stimulus [5].
Previous studies suggested that sensory decisions require
the accumulation of sensory evidence [6, 7] and that the
PRP reflects the inability to form more than one decision at
a time [4, 8]. In the present study, we used a psychophysical
reverse-correlation technique [9, 10] to measure the time-
course of evidence accumulation during the PRP. We found
that the accumulation of evidence could occur during the
PRP albeit with a reduced efficiency, which implies that mul-
tiple decision processes can occur in parallel in the human
brain. In addition to the reduced efficiency of evidence accu-
mulation, our results uncover an additional delay in the
routing of the decision to motor structures during the PRP,
which implies that the process of sensory decision making
isseparable fromthepreparationofamotor response [11–13].Results
There are many parallel pathways that connect the sensory
and motor areas of the human brain. Yet, human behavior is
remarkably serial. If multiple sensory decisions have to be
made in close succession, earlier decisions postpone the later
ones, but the cause of this seriality is not well understood. A
direct approach to study the interference between successive
tasks is with the psychological refractory period (PRP) para-
digm, in which two stimuli that require independent responses
are presented in close succession [2–4, 14]. The ubiquitous
finding is that the response time to the second stimulus6These authors contributed equally to this work
*Correspondence: p.roelfsema@nin.knaw.nlincreases markedly if the time between stimuli is short
(w400 ms or less), as if the human brain is simply unable to
make two decisions at the same time. Behavioral studies
attributed the bottleneck to a limitation in response-selection
[4], which is usually modeled as a process that accumulates
information over time [15–19] and commits to a choice when
the evidence (the ‘‘decision variable’’) reaches a threshold.
Support for accumulation models has come from investiga-
tions in behaving monkeys, which identified neurons in
association areas of the parietal and frontal cortex with activity
that closely matches the dynamics of these decision variables
[6, 7, 20–22].
Previous studies [8, 23] suggested that dual-task interfer-
ence might reflect a reduced efficiency of evidence accumula-
tion. One possibility is that sensory evidence can only accumu-
late for one task at a time [8]. Another possibility is that
evidence accumulation proceeds in parallel for multiple deci-
sions [23], but only one of them can be routed to a motor
program at any one time [24]. This latter model implicitly
distinguishes between two stages in response selection that
have often been lumped together in previous work [6, 25]:
the integration of sensory evidence and the subsequent
routing of the decision to the motor response.
To measure how dual-task interference affects the evidence
accumulation, we designed a PRP experiment in which a first
task (T1) interfered with a second task (T2) that required the
integration of noisy sensory evidence. We investigated how
fluctuations in the sensory signal influenced the subject’s
decision with a ‘‘classification image’’ technique [9, 10, 26].
Specifically, the method allowed us to measure the influence
of sensory evidence presented at different time points on the
decision for T2. We examined three alternative models
(sketched in Figure 1A): (1) integration of evidence for T2 is
not possible during the PRP; (2) integration occurs normally
during the PRP; and (3) integration occurs but is less effi-
cient—reflecting some form of capacity sharing [27]. In addi-
tion, we determined whether the PRP bottleneck also causes
a delay in the routing of the decision to the motor response,
once evidence accumulation is complete.
Three human participants performed two tasks as fast as
possible. The first ‘‘tone task’’ (T1) was an auditory discrimina-
tion task. Participants decided whether the frequency of
a single pure tone was high (880 Hz) or low (440 Hz) (Figures
1B and 1C). Task 2 was a visual task that required a luminance
comparison: participants decided which of two flickering
patches was, on average, brighter. We adjusted the difficulty
of the luminance comparison so that subjects were w75%
correct (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures available
online) and presented it at a variable stimulus-onset asyn-
chrony (SOA) of 0, 120, 200, 520, or 600 ms. We instructed
the participants to respond to the tone task before the visual
task and collected 10,000 trials per subject so that we could
examine how well the three models of Figure 1 fitted the data
for every individual subject.
Evidence Integration during the PRP
Wefirst analyzed the effect of SOAon response times (RTs). As
in previous studies [4], we observed a strong effect of SOA on
Figure 1. Models of Evidence Accumulation during the PRP and Design of the Experiment to Distinguish between Them
(A) A decision ismade by the accumulation of sensory evidence. Noisy sensory evidence is shown in gray, and the accumulated evidence (Acc) for T1 and T2
is shown in light blue and red, respectively. For clarity, only a single barrier is shown, but two symmetrical bounds at6B0 are generally used to model two-
alternative forced-choice decisions. The accumulation process ends when it reaches one of these barriers. Additional perceptual (P) and postaccumulation
(PAcc) latencies add to the total response time. Three alternative models are shown for the second task of the PRP paradigm, which differ in how the
accumulation of evidence for T2 is influenced by T1. If only one accumulation process can proceed at a time, then the integration for T2 is delayed at a short
SOA (‘‘serial integration’’) [8]. Alternatively, if the accumulation of evidence for the two tasks can proceed in parallel, no influence should be observed on the
accumulation process (‘‘parallel integration’’). Dual-task interference could also be caused by a reduction in the efficacy of accumulation for T2 (‘‘partial
integration’’). Note that all models can result in the same response-time to T2 (RT2) by adjusting PAcc.
(B) Experimental design. Subjects performed a tone discrimination task (T1) followed by a luminance discrimination task (T2), which involved decidingwhich
of two patches was brightest. Each patch consisted of four bars and independent luminance noise was added to each bar and updated at a frequency of
25 Hz. The SOAs were randomly selected on each trial and could take values of [0, 120, 200, 520, 600] ms. Responses were made as fast as possible, using
different hands for the two tasks.
(C) Magnification of one frame of the visual stimulus. The target patch with highest luminance is on the left.
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1796RT in the second task (RT2, p < 1028, see Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures), which was on average 45% longer when
the SOA was 0 ms than when it was 600 ms (Figure 2A). Accu-
racy in the visual task was only slightly influenced by SOA. It
decreased from 77% at an SOA of 0 ms to 74% at an SOA of
600 ms (p < 1028, see Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures). Errors in the tone task were below 2% for every SOA.
The RTs in the tone task (RT1) were slightly influenced by
SOA, with a mean of 447 ms at an SOA of 0 ms and 426 ms
at an SOAof 600ms (Figure 2A). The analyses indicate a typical
PRP effect: RT2 decreased with a slope close to21 as a func-
tion of SOA inside the interference range and was unaffected
by SOA beyond this range (Figure 2A).
The use of time-varying stimuli for T2 allowed us to go
beyond the analysis of RTs and measure how the PRP influ-
ences the integration of sensory evidence. If the PRP inter-
rupts the evidence integration, luminance samples during
this epoch do not influence the subject’s choice. Hence, the
average of the luminance fluctuations during the PRP on
correct and incorrect trials should be equal and the classifica-
tion image should therefore be zero.
We measured classification images for each participant and
illustrate the average classification image across participants
for every SOA in Figure 2B (see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures). Early sensory information had a strong influence
on the decision (Figures 2B and 2C). The classification imagespeaked around the third sample (around 100ms) and gradually
fell back to zero [28]. It is likely that the weak influence of the
later samples is caused by the absence of evidence integration
once the subject has made a decision about which luminance
patch was brighter. Models that posit that the PRP is caused
by the interruption of evidence accumulation predict that
dual-task interference should be manifested by a delay in the
onset of the integration, which should be particularly
pronounced at the shorter SOAs [8]. This is not what we
observed. The early samples always contributed to the deci-
sion, irrespective of SOA (Figures 2B and 2C). Yet, there was
an influence of the PRP on the classification images because
theywere protracted in time for the shorter SOAs. Accordingly,
the classification image at 0ms SOA differed significantly from
that at an SOA of 600 ms, outside the PRP (Monte-Carlo simu-
lation, p < 1028, see Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
These results, taken together, indicate that evidence integra-
tion occurs during the PRP, although it is less efficient.
When we aligned the classification images to RT2, we found
that integration stopped at least 200 ms before the response
[29]. The delay between the peak of the classification image
and the response was larger for the shorter SOAs, which
implies that the PRP also causes a delay once evidence accu-
mulation is complete. Figure 2 shows the average classifica-
tion image, but the effect of the PRP on evidence accumulation
and on the delay between the decision and themotor response
Figure 2. Response Times and Psychophysical Kernels
(A) Average response times for the tone (T1) and visual (T2) tasks.
Different SOAs are indicated with different colors (see legend). Error bars
indicate SEM.
(B) Classification images. Each panel corresponds to a different SOA. Two
classification images are shown in each panel: the solid line shows the
difference in the luminance fluctuations between correct and incorrect trials
of the ‘‘target’’ patch. On correct trials, the luminance of the target patch
tended to be higher. The dashed line shows the same subtraction for the
‘‘distractor’’ patch, which tended to have a lower luminance on correct trials.
(C) Time course of the classification images (‘‘target’’–‘‘distractor’’), after
aligning the luminance fluctuations to the onset of the visual stimulus (left)
or to the time of the response (right). Noise averages in the left portion of
the graph are drawn until one of the three participants had responded in
more than 70% of trials at that SOA. Samples after the subject’s response
were excluded from the trial averages. On the right, the fluctuations were
aligned to the time of the response before computing the classification
images. Noise averages in this portion of the graph are drawn from the times
at which every participant has started integration in at least 30% of trials.
The classification images of individual participants are shown in Figure S1A.
We obtained similar psychophysical kernels with a linear regression anal-
ysis (Figure S1B).
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(Figure S1A).
We also investigated the influence of luminance samples on
RT with a regression analysis (Figure S1B). The results were
highly consistent with the classification image analysis,
because luminance fluctuations during the PRP did influence
RT but their effect was weaker than outside the PRP.
Disentangling the Contributions to the PRP during the
Decision Process
We found that dual-task interference reduces the efficiency
of evidence accumulation but that it is not entirely halted. To
estimate the relative contribution of delays in evidence accu-
mulation and in the mapping of the sensory decision onto
a behavioral response to the PRP, we fitted a model (Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures) that accumulates evidence
until a decision variable reaches a bound for one or the other
decision [15–19].The model simulated the integration of luminance in a deci-
sion variable and includes the three models of Figure 1B for
different values of the model parameters (see Supplemental
Experimental Procedures; parameter values are shown in
Table S1). The model accounted for the complex influence of
dual-task interference on the accumulation of evidence and
provided an excellent fit to the distribution of response times
across SOAs with an average R2 of 0.98 (Figure 3A). The
classification images had not been used for model fitting. We
could therefore test whether the model based its response
on the same luminance samples as the subjects, by calculating
the classification images of the model and comparing them to
the experimental ones. The agreement between the classifica-
tion images of the model and participants was excellent (the
average R2 across SOAwas 0.89) (Figure 3B; Figure S2), which
indicates that the model used the same information as the
subjects did.
The excellent fit implies that we can use the model to
separate the PRP delay into a contribution caused by the
decreased efficiency of evidence integration and another
contribution caused by a delay in routing the decision to the
motor response (Figure 3C). The PRP prolonged the accumu-
lation of evidence by an average of 86 ms (51 6 7 ms, 148 6
12 ms, and 60 6 10 ms in the three participants), accounting
for an average of w35% of the increase in RT at zero SOA.
The gain of the evidence accumulation was reduced to 0.75,
0.41, and 0.74 for the three participants, which indicates
that substantial evidence accumulation occurred during the
PRP. In addition, the PRP increased the subsequent routing
time by an average of 159 ms (139 6 8 ms, 177 6 14 ms, and
161 6 16 ms in the three participants), accounting for an
average of w65% of the increase in RT2 at zero SOA. These
results, taken together, indicate that the PRP-bottleneck
caused a reduction in the efficiency of evidence accumulation
and a longer delay in routing this decision to amotor response.
In spite of the reduced efficacy, evidence integration was
not halted by the PRP. We considered the possibility that the
residual integration might have occurred at low levels of the
visual system, before the PRP-bottleneck. At first sight, such
an explanation may appear unlikely, for two reasons. First,
we presented luminance samples at the same spatial location,
and later samples therefore masked the previous ones.
Second, the task demanded the comparison of the luminances
at two locations, which presumably goes beyond low levels of
the visual system. Nevertheless, we investigated the contribu-
tion of prebottleneck levels to our luminance integration task
in a second experiment (Supplemental Experimental Proce-
dures). Six subjects mentally traced a curve through a series
of three bifurcations. They had to choose the branchwith high-
est luminance at each bifurcation while keeping gaze at a
central fixation (Figure 4A), making three motor responses to
indicate the decisions made at each bifurcation. Evidence
accumulation was highly serial (Figure 4B); the kernel for the
second decision was delayed relative to the first one, and in
turn the kernel for the third decision was delayed relative to
the second one (p < 1028 for both comparisons, permutation
test). These results rule out that low levels of the visual system
integrated the luminance information in the main PRP task.
Discussion
It is generally assumed that dual-task interference during
the PRP reflects the serial nature of the decisional processes
[2, 4] and the inability to select two responses at the same
Figure 3. Fit of a Diffusion Model of Dual-Task Interference
(A) Response time distributions as a function of SOA, for the participants (colored bars) and themodel (black lines). Response times are shown relative to the
onset of the visual stimulus of task 2. The fraction of variance explained by the model fit (R2) is, from left to right, 0.99, 0.98, 0.99, 0.98, and 0.98. Bin width
is 40 ms.
(B) Classification images for the data (colored lines) and model (black lines), as a function of SOA, normalized to the peak value across SOA. The fraction of
variance explained by the model fit (R2) is, from left to right, 0.78, 0.92, 0.91, 0.93, and 0.9. In (A and B), the model was fitted independently for each partic-
ipant, and the resulting fits were averaged across participants.
(C) The model separated RT2 (solid lines) into a time of accumulation (dashed lines, AccT; time at which the boundary is reached) and a postaccumulation
time (dotted lines, PAccT). Error bars indicate SEM across participants. Response time distributions and classification images for individual participants are
shown in Figure S2, and model parameters are shown in Table S1.
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1798time [4]. Here, we determined how the PRP influences the inte-
gration of sensory evidence and the mapping of the decision
onto a motor response. Our results allow us to draw two
main conclusions. First, the integration of sensory evidence
does not constitute an absolute bottleneck because evidence
accumulation for a second task can occur during processing
of the first task, albeit with a reduced efficiency. The control
experiment demonstrated that early, prebottleneck levels are
not responsible for the residual evidence accumulation during
the PRP. Second, the reduction in the efficiency of evidence
accumulation explains only a fraction of the PRP.We observed
that the PRP also caused a long delay after evidence integra-
tion was complete, which was directly visible as a large
increase in the delay between the classification image and
RT2 (Figure 2C, right).Figure 4. Serial Integration of Evidence for Multiple Decisions
(A) Subjects had to trace a curve by choosing the brightest luminance
directions at three locations. As in our main experiment, the luminance at
each bifurcation varied rapidly over time (25 Hz) so that we could measure
evidence accumulation for the three decisions.
(B) The classification images, aligned to the time of the third response.
Evidence for the three decisions accumulated serially, implying that low
levels of the visual system do not automatically integrate luminance infor-
mation for this task. The bottom panel shows the distribution of response
times for the three decisions, aligned to the last response.There is an ongoing debate about the characteristics of
the bottleneck, with some theories suggesting that it operates
serially and can only bemade available for one task at a time [4,
8] and other theories positing that it is parallel because it
reflects a limited resource that can be shared by tasks
[27, 30]. Our results support capacity sharing theories by
showing that the PRP does not delay the onset of evidence
accumulation but that it does reduce its efficacy. By using
a classification image technique, the present study identified
the accumulation of evidence and the routing of the decision
to motor areas as two of the processes that depend on this
‘‘central’’ resource.
The present study determined how task 1 interferes with
task 2 and it thereby complements studies that investigated
‘‘backwards’’ influences of task 2 on task 1 during the PRP
[31–33]. For instance, Hommel [31] demonstrated that the first
response in a dual-task design is faster when it is compatible
with the second, supporting parallel processing for both
tasks. The present results support capacity sharing models
in a complementary manner by showing that evidence accu-
mulation for task 2 can take place during the PRP, albeit with
reduced efficiency.
The present results also have implications for theories on
decision making within a single task. Previous studies sug-
gested that decision making and action selection are insepa-
rable [25, 34]. According to this idea, decisions are taken by
accumulating evidence in those motor structures that deter-
mine the motor response. If a decision is communicated
through an eye movement, then an area like LIP, involved in
eye movement planning, would accumulate the evidence,
whereas another area—like the parietal reach region —would
accumulate evidence if the task requires an arm movement.
However, a recent neurophysiological study demonstrated
that the integration of sensory evidence in area LIP also occurs
if the evidence is not directly linked to a movement plan [13]
and that neuronal signals for evidence integration and eye
movement planning follow different time courses. Our results
support such a separation between sensory decisions and
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a delay in the processes that occurred after the accumulation
of evidence but before the initiation of the response.
We have previously suggested a framework for sequential
decision making, where complex tasks are decomposed into
a sequence of simpler operations that require the integration
of information from the senses or from a previous processing
stage [11]. To explain the present results, such a model would
first accumulate sensory evidence to determine the brightest
patch, and the sensory decision would be followed by a
second integration process that ‘‘routes’’ it to the appropriate
motor response [24]. The use of the classification image
method in a PRP paradigm has provided new insights into
the cause of the processing bottleneck, showing that the
reduced efficacy of accumulation of sensory evidence
accounts for a fraction of the PRP effect, whereas a substantial
delay occurs in the routing of the decision to motor structures.Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes three figures, one table, and Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2012.07.043.
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